On ethics in personal construct theory more

On Ethics in Personal Construct Theory Jonathan D. Raskin Tennessee State University ABSTRACT: In persona! construct theory, people interpret the world in unique ways. Constructions are subjective representations rather than objective truths. This means (hat our ethical construc- tions are (a) potentially wrong, if there is an external moral reality we cannot access, or (b) no more inherently defensible than others' ethical constructions, if all notions of "right" and "wrong" are personally constructed. Constructions promoting violence, hatred, and intolerance are as viable as those promoting peace, love, and acceptance. To overcome this ethical quandary individuals must create meaningful ethical constructions and have faith in them. This is difficult because, as constructivists, we see each person's constructions as legitimate and our own world views as merely constructions, themselves. Implications for moral righteousness are discussed. In many of his writings, George Kelly (1969a, 1970, 1977, 1991a, 1991b) criticized modern psychology's approach to studying persons. Rather than acknowledging the individual's ability to represent, anticipate, and initiate events, modem psychologists often see human behavior as utterly determined. Dehaviorists see behavior as determined by its conse- 98 The Humanistic Psychologist, 23, Spring 1995 quences, psychoanalysts see behavior as determined by dynamic drives, and experimentalists see behavior as determined by independent variable manipulations. While Kelly found merit in each of these approaches to psychology, he believed that there was more to studying persons than simply prediction and control of purely determined behaviors. By contrast, Kelly's personal construct theory1 (PCT) focuses on the ability of human beings to actively represent and shape-their environments. Personal constructs are individually derived for making sense of the world. A construct constitutes a subjectively invented "representation of the universe, a representation erected by a living creature and then tested against the reality of that universe" (Kelly, 1991a, p. 9). Based on their experiences persons create constructs, and use these constructs to give meaning to events. In this conception, meaning is not inherent, but con- structed. Constructive alternativism, the key philosophical tenet of PCT, maintains that the same events can be construed in an infinite number of ways (Kelly, 1991a). The meaning of events differs depending upon an individual's personal constructs. There is no single, 'correct' way to construe events and imbue them with meaning. An infinite number of constructions are possible. Truth in Personal Construct Theory This has important implications for notions of universal truth. Rather than being something that independently exists 'out there' and which must be discovered, truth is something to be construed. For example, psycholo- gists of differing theoretical orientations often construe the same human actions in radically different ways. What constitutes "truth" for a psycho- analyst is likely to be quite different from "truth" for a behaviorist, since their underlying constructions lead them to view events differently. Con- structive altemativism's insistence that an infinite number of ways to construe events are possible implies that truth is not singular and objective. Our determinations of truth are influenced by how we construe events. Kelly had much to say about notions of universal truth. Generally, he believed the d iscovery of universal truths could never be achieved, and was perhaps even an ill-conceived goal since "finding the ultimate explanation of something is about the same kind of quest as trying to capture certainty in a formula or truth in a dogma" (Kelly, 1969a, p. 43). Kelly's belief in the subjective nature of perception is consistent with the humanistic psy- chology of Carl Rogers (1959,1961). Like Rogers, Kelly (1977) questioned Jonathan D. Raskin 99 whether truths generally regarded as "objective" were actually so, arguing that even "objective" truths have their origins in subjective constructions: What we tend to do is to accept familiar constructs as downright objective observations of what is really there, and to view with great suspicion anything whose subjective origin is recent enough to recognize. The fact that familiar constructs have equally subjec- tive—though possibly more remote—origins usually escapes us. (p. 5) Kelly put it even more succinctly, observing that "what we think we know is anchored only in our own assumptions, not in the bed rock of truth itself (Kelly, 1977, p. 6). Regardless of the truths sought, individuals make assumptions about the world that influence their understanding of it. Even "objective" scientists are influenced byunderlyingconstructionsthataffect their interpretations of events. For example, a psychologist's psychotherapeutic goals have to be understood as part of the psychologist's functional involvement with a theoretical position in which his working assumptions about the nature of mankind, and of his client, have been made to stand out as clearly as possible. (Kelly, 1980, p. 26) In a recent article Mc Wil liams (1993) addresses the theoretical aspects of personal construct theory that preclude the discovery of objective truths separate from the person construing those truths. He argues that PCT "views knowledge as indeterminate" (p. 269), and calls the tendency for people to mistake personal constructions as objective truths a form of idolatry. Idolatry is "the worship of a created image as though it were the ultimate" (McWilliams, 1993, p. 269). Idolatry is overcome only when persons acknowledge the human participation involved in constructions of reality, and stop treating constructs as if they were real and objective entities and begin treating them as part of a representational process requiringactive human involvement (McWilliams, 1993). By forgetting the constructed nature of all versions of truth people inappropriately reify particular notions of reality. McWilliams (1993) observes that "substituting an ad interim construction for reality itself gambles dangerously on a shortcut to the unending quest for knowledge" (p. 271). Kelly was quite aware of the dangerous shortcuts McWilliams dis- cusses. He always tried to keep in mind the construing process behind his own theory. He accomplished this by acknowledging the assumptions of his own theory, and through pointing out that his theory, like all theories, is simply a working model for comprehending human thought, feeling, and behavior. He observed that personal construct theory "has a limited range 100 The Humanistic Psychologist, 23, Spring 1995 of convenience, its range being restricted, as far as we can see at this moment, to human personality and, more particularly, to problems of interpersonal relations" (Kelly, 1991a, p. 9). In addition, he admitted that the advent of personal construct theory does not signal the discovery of universal psychological truths, but represents one particular system for construing psychological processes. In other words, Kelly admitted that PCT is based on his own assumptions about human nature: All this is... my own particular assumption about the nature of man. Moreover, it is the way 1, too, look to see what will happen, for, unlike most psychologists I know... my theory of personality applies to me as well as to people 1 don't like. (Kelly, 1980, p. 27) Kelly's words imply that he viewed the identification of universal truth as an impossible task. He asserted that "new constructs are obviously invented, not discovered" (Kelly, 1980, p. 33). This is important, indicating that personal construct theory is not concerned so much with notions of universal truth as it is with the ways in which individuals construe the world and come to accept certain constructions as universal truths. Implications for Distinguishing Between Good and Evil Kelly's constructivism has ethical implications that present a dilemma for those who argue that certain behaviors are ethically sound, while other behaviors are ethically reprehensible. If Kelly's constructivism is accepted and notions of universal truth are abandoned, then it becomes impossible to accept the existence of universal ethical principles that apply to all persons. Common conceptions of good and evil (or, if you prefer, right and wrong) become constructed labels affixed to particular behaviors and rooted in underlying assumptions. Acknowledging the constructive nature of good and evil has implications for all human activities; it affects the way we live, the way we think, the way we evaluate others, and the way we treat those whose views differ from our own. More narrowly, for those of us who are psychologists practicing psychotherapy, acknowledging the construc- tive nature of good and evil affects the way we approach our clients. In a paper designed to address the constructive nature of ethics (specifically sin) and its relevance for psychotherapy and life in general, Kelly (1969b) analyzed the origin of good and evil by examining the constructions underlying the Garden of Eden story from the Book of Genesis. By discussing Kelly's paper in depth, his belief in the construc- tivist nature of all ethical principles will become clear. Kelly (1969b) determined that the Eden story contains "at least three essential constructs" Jonathan D. Raskin 101 (p. 169). These constructs are loneliness versus companionship, innocence versus knowledge, and good versus evil. First, Adam and Eve chose companionship over loneliness. Having done so, they were then faced with a choice between innocence and knowledge; they chose knowledge. How- ever, once knowledge was chosen, Adam and Eve were faced with choosing between good and evil. According to Kelly (1969b), human beings are still uncertain of which side of the good-evil dimension to choose because "good and evil have proved to be extremely elusive values" (p. 170). In other words, we have been unable to agree on universally accepted con- structions of good and evil. This makes choosing between them much more difficult. Because it is tremendously difficult, Kelly (1969b) argued that many people actively avoid distinguishing between good and evil. Often, this is done by attempting to reconstrue the dimensions of innocence versus knowledge and companionship versus loneliness, which both preceded good versus evil as constructive choices. That is, many people try to choose innocence and loneliness as ways to avoid facing the construct of good versus evil at all. However, for human beings to avoid companionship and knowledge altogether is no easy task. Even though they try, people are unable to fully prevent being confronted by situations in which they must make distinctions between right and wrong (Kelly, 1969b). What is interesting about Kelly's interpretation of the Eden story is that he openly acknowledged the constructivist nature of all ethical beliefs. To Kelly (1969b), people avoid confronting notions of good and evil because it is preferable to avoid "the awful responsibility for distinguishing good from evil amidst shifting circumstances, and then making a firm choice between them" (p. 170) than it is to acknowledge the universe as a place of utter ethical relativism in which they alone are responsible for deciding what is right and what is wrong. People are not simply required to distinguish good from evil; once they have made such distinctions, they must choose which construct pole they intend to live by. Though it is difficult, there are indeed people who devise strategies for classifying human actions along the construct dimension of good versus evil. Kelly (1969b) outlined four potential strategies for doing so: law, authority, conscience, and purpose. Each is effective in some ways, but flawed in other ways. Those who employ law as a strategy attempt to create a set of rules by which good can be distinguished from evil. While Kelly (1969b) acknow- ledged rules as "useful handrails for the morally nearsighted" (p. 173), he felt that people who rely too heavily on rules are "only seeking to avoid the 102 The Humanistic Psychologist, 23, Spring 1995 foresight of what, in the end, good and evil will turn out to be" (p. 173). Related to law is the strategy of authority. Authority holds that "if I cannot distinguish between good and evil myself, I will hang on to the coattails of someone who can" (p. 173). Both authority and law hinge on obedience as indicative of right and wrong: obedience to rules or obedience to authority. Conscience, Kelly's (1969b) third strategy, "places the responsibility for distinguishing good from evil squarely on the shoulders of die individual" (p. 174). However, Kelly (1969b) quickly pointed out that one's conscience is often bound by outdated rules and loyalties to authority. The fourth strategy for identifying good and evil is purpose. When we live according to purpose, we decide what kind of world we would like to have in the future and "anything we do to hasten it is good, and anything we do to delay it is evil" (Kelly, 1969b, p. 174). The problem with purpose is that our entire moral system collapses if we change our view of Utopia. Interestingly, Kelly (1969b) felt that law, authority, conscience, and purpose corre- sponded to the four primary ethical systems of his day—Judaism, Catholi- cism, Protestantism, and Communism. Kelly presented and debunked each of the strategies for devising a system of ethics in order to emphasize the constructivist nature of the entire enterprise. Ethical value systems bywhichwedistinguish right from wrong are created by individuals; societal values are created when individuals cooperate in constructing an ethical system. Though Kel ly (1969b) believed that societally constructed ethical principles had improved during the course of history, he was quick to emphasize that there was much work left to be done. He disliked what he saw as people's efforts to avoid the difficulties involved in struggling to elaborate the constructions in their own ethical systems. He lamented that "most of the systems for dealing with good and evil are designed to circumvent the necessity for coming to grips with the problem" (Kelly, 1969b, p. 183). It is much harder to construe good and evil for yourself than it is to simply accept the constructions of good and evil provided by others. Why struggle with a perplexity for which you can never hope to devise more than a partial solution, when this culture, or that religion, will provide you with a thumb-indexed set of answers in tomorrow's mail, or, at the latest, during next Sunday's morning church services? (Kelly, 1969b, p. 183) Further emphasizing the constructed nature of ethical principles, Kelly (1969b) argued that nobody has fully resolved the issue of how to distin- guish between good and evil. Understanding the constructed nature of ethics in PCT can lead to genuine efforts to clarify and elaborate one's own Jonathan D. Raskin 103 beliefs. However, it can also lead to a state of ethical relativism that makes many people uncomfortable. We discuss the potential conflicts that arise from a Kellyian view of ethics below. Kelly's Perspective and the Dilemma of Ethical Relativism Kelly was aware of the implications that PCT has regarding ethics. If ethical positions are constructed, rather than discovered or revealed, then there is no way to be certain which ethical position is the "correct" one. This does not imply that Kelly himself felt that all ethical positions were equal. He seemed somewhat wary of the implication that there is no way to distinguish good from evil: What I have said so far may suggest that man simply cannot distinguish good from evil. In the sense of making an ultimate distinction... he cannot. But man does distinguish the two after a fashion. He may not do it well enough, but nonetheless, he does it. (Kelly, 1969b, p. 176) Kelly's comment is interesting because it touches on a very important issue, one that Kelly may have felt ambivalent about. As argued earlier, Kelly emphasized the constructivist nature of ethics; we invent ethical values, rather than discover them. This is not that different from Epting and Amerikaner's (1980) view of the self: "Personal Construct Theory tries to convey the idea that the self to be fulfilled is primarily invented and often reinvented rather than discovered or uncovered" (p. 56). However, Kelly can be interpreted as saying that we have to distinguish good from evi I; that is, we need to use our constructive abilities to approximate absolute, ethical standards as best we can. Constructions that come closest to absolute, ethical standards are the most morally correct ones. Perhaps this explains why Kelly (1969b) felt that society's ethical constructions had improved throughout history; during the course of history, peoples' constructions have become closer to absolute, universal ethical standards. If so, we can safely maintain that certain ethical constructions are wrong, and therefore immoral. While ethically comforting, there are problems with such a position. The world would certainly be a much easier place to live in if we could identify which ethical constructions come closest to absolute ethical stand- ards. I lowever, personal construct theory prevents us from ever feeling too certain in claiming that we have discovered absolute truths. This is particu- larly salient when it comes to ethics. Even if we truly believe that our ethical position is preferable to someone else's, how do we knowthat our construe- 104 The Humanistic Psychologist, 23, Spring 1995 tions, and not someone else's, most closely reflect absolute ethical stand- ards? Discovering absolute truths in the objective world of observable objects is difficult enough, if even possible at all. In the realm of ethics— where empirical data is less common and less definitive when it does exist—it is hard to prove that one ethica I construction more closely approxi- mates an absolute, universal ethical standard than another. In fact, if we reexamine Kelly's (1969b) interpretation of the Eden story, good and evil themselves are merely constructs invented by people. If human beings were incapable of construing events, would the constructs of good and evil even exist? The notion of good and evil as constructed rather than discovered can be quite disturbing, particularly for those who believe that absolute, ethical standards do exist. WalterTruett Anderson (1990) effectively demonstrates the ethical difficulties that result from a purely constructivist view of the world. For instance, he discusses the controversy that arose in the Montana school system when parents objected to the teaching of "values clarifica- tion" and "moral reasoning''—which emphasize the relative merits of each individual's personal ethics instead of traditional, Christian beliefs (Ander- son, 1990). What upset the parents was "the proposition that values are not based on any utter certainty about what is true and right, and have to be worked out by fallible human beings in the midst of daily life" (Anderson, 1990, p. 14). More directly, many people were upset because they felt that teaching values clarification came "perilously close to teaching that there is no right and wrong" (Anderson, 1990, p. 14). Many constructivists are likely to perceive rigidity in the way that the outraged parents construed events; due to the rigid and unyielding manner in which they construed events, the parents were unable to see alternative constructions that differed from their own. At first we might argue that constructive rigidity is to be expected from fundamentalist Christians; any constructivist thinker can easily see that teaching moral reasoning in the schools is simply a way to help students better elaborate their own, individual ethical constructions. But if we take the argument to its logical conclusion, the outraged parents seem to be expressing a genuine concern. If we accept that there is no inherent right and wrong, then are all ethical systems equally viable? For example, are the ethical views of Neo-Nazis just as acceptable as our own views? From a constructivist viewpoint, they very well might be. While one can offer many powerful arguments against Neo-Nazism, each is based on underlying ethical constructions, not access to universal ethical standards. However, this places us in a very serious ethical dilemma—pure ethical relativism, where anything goes. In such a Jonathan D. Raskin 105 world, morality is so relative as to make behaving ethically, or even evaluating the ethics of others, almost impossible; one's ethical beliefs are either no more defensible than anybody else's because all notions of right and wrong are entirely invented by people or, all notions of right and wrong are (at least to some degree) incorrect because human beings are incapable of fully discovering absolute ethical standards. Either way, a PCT view of ethics leaves us in an ethical quandary, wherein universal ethical standards either do not exist at all (thus, all ethical positions are of equal worth), or are beyond our purview (thus, we cannot be certain whether or not our ethical standards are more correct than others'). To many people, this is simply unacceptable. If Kelly's theory cannot offer anything in terms of moral guidance, than of what value is it? Below, an effort is made to offer a solution to this predicament. Faith and the Immorality of Dogmatism and Righteousness Personal construct theory does offer a way out of the dilemma of ethical relativism, but it does not do so by identifying which kinds of constructions are ethical and which are not. Of course, like all ethical propositions, the ethical solution offered by PCT is rooted in certain underlying assumptions, and having faith in these assumptions is necessary in order to escape the nihilism of a purely relativistic position. Faith is a critical component of any belief system, and is especially important when considering ethics. In discussing faith, Kelly (1977) maintained that al- though we cannot be certain of the way things are, we can have faith that our constructions come closest to approximating the truth. We cannot know for sure that our ethical constructions are more inherently "good" than those whose moral stands are in direct opposition to our own; all we can do is have faith that, by continually reevaluating our constructions, we can get closer to the truth. As soon as the notion of faith is introduced, the basis for one's faith becomes of vital importance; more will be said about this shortly. For the moment, it is necessary to simply point out that faith is critical to any ethical system. Faith is the basis for all ethical beliefs. If we ask people why they believe certain actions to be moral and others to be immoral, they will respond in various ways. Some will argue that religious tenets dictate moral behavior. Others will contend that morality is implied by logic. Some will see common sense at the root of their moral systems. These are just the most obvious explanations people will offer; the possibilities are infinite. However, no matter how many moral justifications are offered, each will 106 The Humanistic Psychologist, 23, Spring 1995 be based on faith—faith in religious doctrine, the purity of reason, the obviousness of common sense, or something else all together. Faith, for the most part, need not be construed as a negative. There are many things that each of us believes that we may not be, able to demonstrate in uncertain terms; faith, coupled with a practical skepticism, allows us to believe particular moral positions to be valid while realizing that we may be exposed to events that lead us to later change our position. Learning to live with the uncertainty of one's beliefs is an integral part of human existence. Becoming comfortable with the need to take a Kierkegaardian leap of faith towards particular beliefs is something most people struggle with at some point in their lives. A constructivist perspective implies (hat it is only when faith in one's beliefs becomes rigid and unyielding that problems arise. Kelly encouraged us to construe 'good' and 'evil,' and to have faith in those constructions, while realizing that they are merely constructions. Acknowledging the role of faith in ethics has implications for righteous- ness. Currently, there are many people who present their moral convictions with a sense of indignant righteousness. This righteousness implies that their moral views are "correct" and those of their enemies are "incorrect." Often, righteousness leads people to argue that dissenting moral opinions should beeliminated; only the "correct" moral position has a right to exist. In other words, moral righteousness fosters intolerance. Kelly (1969b) opposed such intolerance, criticizing the constructive rigidity of those who want to take ethical matters "into theirown hands and conclude the question in their own terms of morality "(p. 185). Forcing one's own morality upon others through the imposition and alleviation of guilt "is the most powerful device man has ever invented for bringing about individual conformity and cutting short man's personal quest for distinguishing good from evil" (Kelly, 1969b, p. 185). A constructivist stance makes moral righteousness more d ifficult. PCT emphasizes that all moral positions are built upon particular constructions of events, and that these constructions are invented by people. If more people adopted a constructivist perspective, righteousness might be less- ened. It becomes more difficult to be righteous when we realize that our own ethical viewpoint is not inherently correct, but built upon underlying personal constructions. Further, once we acknowledge that other people's moral positions are built upon their constructions, it becomes easier to see morality from another's point of view. Again, Rogers' (1959, 1961) person-centered approach comes to mind, in which we attempt to under- stand the world from the subjective viewpoint of others. By temporarily adopting the ethical constructions of others, we can experience morality Jonathan D. Raskin 107 from their perspective. This does not mean that we have to adopt the moral positions of others. It simply means that we better understand the moral positions of others and, perhaps, become less righteous about the inherent correctness of our own position. Kelly (1991a) emphasized this idea in discussing personal construct theory's sociality corollary, which holds that people can take on roles in relationship to one another when they attempt to understand each other'sconstruct systems. This requires making an effort to appreciate the viewpoints held by others, leaving little room for right- eousness. Stated Kelly (1991a): In order to play a constructive role in relation to another person one must not only, in some measure, see eye to eye with him but must, in some measure, have an acceptance of him and his way of seeing things, (p. 66) Closely related to righteousness is the notion of dogmatism. It can be argued that the only moral principle upheld by a constructivist perspective is that ethical dogmatism, the primary cause of righteousness, is unaccept- able. When persons rigidly insist that their constructions of events are the only mora I constructions avai lable, they are behaving in a dogmatic fashion. Dogmatism interferes with sociality; that is, it prevents people from playing constructive roles in relationship to each other, and this is often quite dangerous. In discussing the sociality corollary, Kelly (1991a) noted that "the warriors who sprang up from the dragon's teeth sown by Jason had much in common but, misconstruing each other's motives, they failed to share in a constructive enterprise and soon destroyed each other" (p. 66). From a constructivist perspective, dogmatism of any sort can be categorized as unethical because it closes down alternatives. Using dogma- tism and righteousness as indicators, it becomes easierto identify particular positions as immoral. For example, the ethical views of a Neo-Nazi are distasteful and unethical to a constructivist thinker not only because oftheir hateful and venomous content, but also because they allow for no further experimentation or elaboration. The Neo-Nazi has so much faith in his or her ethical constructions that dogmatic righteousness results, wherein anything that advances the cause is seen as ethically justifiable. Dogmatism and righteousness are not unique toNeo-Nazis. All of us engage in dogmatic construing at times. Any time that we maintain an ethical position is unchangeable because it is inherent, we are violating the implied nature of a constructivist ethics. We are also falling into what Sartre (1956) termed "bad faith." In other words, wejustify our moral certainty as due to an ability to access some form of universal truth rather than as the 108 The Humanistic Psychologist. 23, Spring 1995 product of our own consiniclion processes. From a constructivist perspec- tive, one cannot ever fully access universal truth because one is forever locked into personal, and often fallible, constructions. Kelly's theory is written in an "invitational mood,", wherein readers are encouraged lo entertain the infinite number of ways to perceive events (Epting & Leilner, 1992). It seems reasonable to maintain that when people stop actively questioning and reevaluating their ethical constructions and assume their positions to be the only correct ones available, they begin to behave in an unethical fashion. This is similar to the position of Walker (1992), who speaks of the prescriptive aspects of Kelly's theory and argues that engag- ing the world as a risk-taking adventurer is preferable to being a conserva- tive dogmatist. Faith, Commitment, and Underlying Constructs As already mentioned, Kelly (1977) emphasized that we can never be sure that our constructions are true, but we can have faith that they most closely approximate the truth. Me argued that "it is this faith that distin- guishes the psychology of the unknown from simple psychological agnos- ticism" (Kelly, 1977, p. 15). In order to implement faith, individuals must engage themselves in the world (Kelly, 1977). They must seek out new constructive experiences that are built upon their faith in a particular construction of events; for Kelly (1977), "it is experience, sought out in full cycle, that is the implementation of the faith" (p. 15). Thus, Kelly's acknowledgment of the constructed nature of ethics does not imply that individuals should forsake all ethical positions. Each individual is encour- aged to believe in a particular version of truth that is based upon faith in personally created constructs. Ethical positions are part of this personally constructed truth. Kelly (1977) observed that "this, as I see it, is commit- ment—what I have called 'self-involvement plus anticipation"' (p. 15). Even though Kelly (1977) emphasized the need for faith and commit- ment, he felt that people ought to be open to new experiences, and be willing to reconstrue even their most superordinate constructs (Kelly, 1991a). People should have faith in their ethical constructions while realizing that they are just constructions, and not absolute truths. Kelly (1977) wrote: There is a psychology for getting along with the unknown. Il is a psychology that says in effect [sic] Why not go ahead and construe it to be organized—or disorganized, if you prefer—and do some- thing about it. In the world of unknowns seek experience, and seek it full cycle, (p. 19) Jonathan D. Raskin 109 The question that arises, and which was alluded to earlier, is "what is the basis for faith?" Why should 1 believe certain ethical constructions to be preferable to others when I have no objective indicators to guide my decision making process? Further, how can I be committed to an ethical position when I know that my position is simply the result of my unique, and imperfect, construing process? This seems to be a recurring theme in existentialism. In his famous lecture, "Existentialism is a Humanism," Sartre (1975) found himself in a similar ethical dilemma involving relativ- ism. Sartre argued that there is no inherent morality. Living in good faith, according to Sartre (1956, 1975), involves choosing an action and taking responsibility for that action and its consequences. However, since there are no signs in the world directing us towards "correct" choices, there is nowhere to look for moral guidance regarding which of our choices are most ethical (Sartre, 1975). For Sartre, it is the fact that we choose—rather than what we choose—that is the key to living authentically; the morality of one's choices cannot be determined. Many people have objected to Sartre's (1975) conclusion that morality is purely a matter of choosing an action and accepting its consequences; a murderer may take responsibility for killing, but does this make murder a moral act? Given the constructed nature of ethics in personal construct theory, avoiding Sartre's rather hopeless conclusion seems difficult. How- ever, maybe it can be avoided if we step backward and observe the world around us. Despite Sartre's claim that there are no ethical indicators in the world, it seems that most people do exhibit faith and commitment towards particular moral positions. They believe that certain behaviors are moral and others are immoral. From a humanistic perspective, then, perhaps we have been focusing on the wrong questions. That is, perhaps arguing over the merits of ethical relativism versus ethical certainty should give way to a new question: what is it that allows people to have "faith" in particular ethical positions? What is the experience of this faith like? How can we better understand the faith that people have in their personal ethical con- structions? Perhaps investigating the experience of faith—which seems inherently illogical to most empiricists (who require firm, external evidence as proof that something is right or wrong)—can allow us to understand the ways in which persons come to construct and accept a system of ethics. While this seems a daunting task, perhaps it is easiest if we begin by examining where we derive our own ethical beliefs from. Why do we believe some actions to be good and other actions to be evil? What is our evidence for these beliefs? Are there alternative constructions of the same evidence? If so, where does faith enter the picture and allow us to accept 110 The Humanistic Psychologist, 23, Spring 1995 our constructions of the evidence and reject equally viable alternative constructions? From a constructivist perspective, perhaps faith comes from basing one's ethical positions on underlying .constructions of reality. If Ellen construes happiness as a vital necessity in life, she is likely to see actions that further happiness as moral and those that hamper it as immoral. On the other hand, if Joe construes duty to others as the most important aspect of human interactions, then he is likely to see behaviors that are dutiful as moral and those that are not as immoral. Further, because their underlying constructions regarding what is valuable differ, Joe and Ellen may come into moral conflict. When Ellen stands up at work and demands a vacation for herself and her colleagues, Joe. may perceive her as ethically wrong because he construes duty to his employer as the morally upstanding course of action. Similarly, when Joe refuses to confront the boss and demand vacation time, Ellen may perceive him as morally weak for failing to stand up for his rights. In both cases, Ellen and Joe's ethical standards are influenced by more subtle, unacknowledged constructs. Kelly (1991a) distinguished between core and peripheral constmcts. The former are used to maintain one's identity, while the latter are less central to the person and therefore more susceptible to change. Further, Kelly (1991a) discussed preverbal constructs, which are invented and used even though they have no word symbols by which to identify them. Often, preverbal constructs "represent a kind of core of the client's construction system. They are likely to deal with the self as well as with other people and inanimate things" (Kelly, 1991a, pp. 341-342). In talking about faith and ethics it seems important to attend to core, often preverbal, construc- tions. In many ways, people's most core constructs go unnoticed; they are so central to the person that they are not perceived as constructions, but simply as accurate representations of the real world and the self. People do not have to consciously choose to be faithful to their core constructions. Core constructions simply become a part of how persons perceive them- selves and the world to be. In other words, people have faith in their core constructions without necessarily doing so in a self-aware, cognitively conscious manner. This gets around the idea that people simply choose constructions in random fashion, and instead emphasizes the affective component of faith. It also helps make clear how difficult altering one's core constructions can be. While people can indeed change core construc- tions, it is usually a long and troublesome process; the struggles a client usually goes through during the course of psychotherapy attest to this. Jonathan D. Raskin 111 Understanding how people's core constructs influence their world views can help us conceptualize how people come to have faith in certain ethical positions. It seems that ethics is something quite central to each of us. We often fail to realize that many of our own beliefs are tied in with faith in certain core constructions, and we therefore get locked into looking for objectively true data that justifies an ethical assertion rather than looking at the experience of faith and how it relates to our most inner thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. We believe certain things to be true because our experience tells us so. However, our point of view is influenced by our core constructs. People often experience the same event and yet come to- different conclusions about it. Regarding ethics, this is an almost constant occurrence. The example that seems most obvious in today's world is the abortion debate. People on both sides of the issue construe the same circumstances in entirely different ways and seem almost incapable of seeing one another's viewpoints. People on both sides have firm faith in the morality of their stance. What core construct differences are there between pro-choicers and anti-abortionists? When taking a constructivist perspective, both sides have a point—if only one tries to adopt that side's assumptions (core constructs). While often these assumptions cannot be verbalized in a cogent manner, they do indeed influence people's ethical construing. The Construction of Morality: An Ongoing Enterprise Kelly (1977) encouraged us to have faith that our moral constructions are closest to the truth, even though we can never be certain that they are. Because each of us has faith in the "truth" of our moral constructions, it is important that we recognize that having faith in our constructions does not mean that our constructions are correct; in so doing, we can avoid dogmatic righteousness and work towards understanding and tolerance of alternative positions. Understanding and tolerance of alternative positions may lead to a clearer sense of other people's moral constructions and, possibly, to the creation of new ways to construe "right" and "wrong." Kelly (1977) observed that if you are willing to reconstnie life altogether... you may not find that you guessed right, but you will stand a chance of transcending more freely those "obvious" facts that now appear to determine your affairs, and you just may get a little closer to the truth that lies somewhere over the horizon, (p. 19) 112 The Humanistic Psychologist, 23, Spring 1995 A PCT view of ethics is potentially discomforting because it pushes us towards perceiving ail ethics as personally constructed. While this forces us to view all ethical systems as potentially equal in value, it also forces us to acknowledge alternative ethical positions, making it more difficult for us to self-righteously impose our ethical views on others. Perhaps most importantly, personal construct psychology places'the responsibility for inventing viable ethical principles squarely on the shoulders of each and every human being. As Kelly (1969b), himself, emphatically stated: The important thing to remember is, despite all the blatant claims that are made on every hand, no one has yet constructed the final answer to the question of what is good and what is evil, and that the moment man gives up the enterprise he is lost. (p. 186) References Anderson, W. T. (1990). Reality isn't what it used to be: Theatrical politics, ready-to-wear religion, global myths, primitive chic, and other wonders of th$ postmodern world. San Francisco: I larper. Epting, F. R., & Amerikaner, M. (1980). Optimal functioning: A personal construct approach. In A.W. Landfield & L. M. Leitner (Eds.), Personal construct psychology: Psychotherapy and personality (pp. 55-73). New York: John Wiley. Epting, F. R., & Leitner, L. M. (1992). Humanistic psychology and personal construct theory. The Humanistic Psychologist, 20, 243-259. Kelly, G. A. (1969a). Ontological acceleration. In B. Maher (Ed.), Clinical psychology and personality: The selected papers of George Kelly (pp. 7-45). New York: John Wiley. Kelly, G. A. (1969b). Sin and psychotherapy. In B. Maher (Ed.), Clinical psychology and personality: The selected papers of George Kelly (pp. 165-188). New York: John Wiley. Kelly, G. A. (1970). A brief introduction to personal construct theory. In D. Bannister (Ed.), Perspectives in personal construct theory (pp. 1 -29). London: Academic Press. Kelly, G. A. (1977). The psychology of the unknown. In D. Bannister (Ed.), New perspectives in personal construct theory (pp. 1-19). London: Aca- demic Press. Kelly, G. A. (1980). A psychology of the optimal man. In A. W. Landfield & L. M. Leitner (Eds.), Personal construct psychology: Psychotherapy and personality (pp. 18-35). New York: John Wiley. Kelly, G. A. (1991a). The psychology of personal constructs. Vol. I: A theory of personality. London: Routledge. (Original work published 1955) Jonathan D. Raskin 113 Kelly, G. A. (1991b). The psychology of personal constructs. Vol. 2: Clinical diagnosis and psychotherapy. London: Routledge. (Original work pub- lished 1955) McWilliams.S. A. (1993). Construct no idols. International Journal of Personal Construct Psychology, 6, 269-280. Rogers, C. R. (1959). A theory of therapy, personality, and interpersonal relationships, as developed in the client-centered framework. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A study of science: Vol. 3. Formulations of the person and the social contact (pp. 184-256). New York: McGraw Hill. Rogers, C. R. (1961). On becoming a person. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Sartre, J. P. (1956). Being and nothingness (H. E. Barnes, Trans.). New York: Washington Square Press. Sartre, J. P. (1975). Existentialism is a humanism (P. Mairet, Trans.). In W. Kaufmann (Ed.), Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre (rev. ed., pp. 345-369). New York: New American Library. Walker, B. M. (1992). Values and Kelly's theory: Becoming a good scientist. InternationalJournal of Personal Construct Psychology, 5, 259-269. Jonathan D. Raskin obtained his B.A. in psychology from Vassar College. After completing his doctoral internship at Emory University's Counseling Center, as part of his Ph.D. in counseling psychology at the University of Florida, he joins the counseling psychology faculty at Tennessee State University. He has published articles applying personal construct theory to notions of mental illness and homosexuality. Address correspondence to Jonathan D. Raskin, Department of Psychology, Tennessee State Univer- sity, 3500 John A. Merritt Boulevard, Nashville, TN 37209-1561.